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Abstract
In this project we explore a technique known as differential power analysis and
its strength as an attack in the cryptanalyst’s arsenal. We begin by looking into
side-channel attacks and how they operate in regards to a cryptosystem. Further,
we explore the usage of mathematical models known as the Hamming Weight and
Hamming Distance which provide a correlation between a given cryptographic protocol
and its power consumption. The Data Encryption Standard (DES) and Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES-128) are used as targets for the attack and are discussed in
theory as well as how they are exploited using power characteristics. Finally, we share
our attack and how it fairs when attempting to retrieve DES and AES-128 keys as well
some insight as to how they can be improved.
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1 Introduction
We live in an age in which almost all sensitive information is controlled and distributed via
computer networks. We have come a long way in protecting this information with a wide
array of cryptographic schemes and protocols, but there are still many concerns for systems
in which the physical implementations can be accessed. Systems which make use of crypto-
graphic protocols that we use everyday such as ATM’s and RFID smartcards are vulnerable
to implementation attacks. Given physical access to the targeted device, an attacker can re-
cover sensitive information which is otherwise supposed to be hidden, such as the devices key
used for encryption. Due to many of these devices being readily available for physical access
and an increasing number of individuals deploying these attacks for personal gain, there is
an evident need for raising the robustness of our current cryptographic implementations by
introducing countermeasures in both hardware and software.
Besides the need for protecting sensitive consumer information, there is another per-
spective to cryptanalysis in which we can use the methods of breaking ciphers to develop
countermeasures and further strengthen them. Many side-channel cryptanalysis methods
exist to attack encryption and authentication schemes running on various platforms. In this
work, we will discuss differential power analysis; a branch of side-channel attacks where the
attack is based on information gained from the power consumption of the cryptosystem.
We do not question the theory of the cipher or its mathematical consistency, but rather
look for clever ways to attack the implementations, such as observing the behavior of regis-
ters and how power levels vary while various instructions execute. By retrieving the power
consumption data from the cryptosystem, we are able to make educated guesses as to how
the algorithm on the system is operating. Furthermore, we can statistically correlate the
power consumption data obtained using the power models and make guesses about parts of
the exact key being used for encryption, once we have a priori knowledge of the protocol
involved.
The primary departure point and main resource for this project is the DPA Contest,
where power consumption information pertaining to a specific cryptosystem is published.
This allows for cryptography researchers around the world to have access to a consistent data
source to test and build on their attacks. The DPA Contest (http://dpacontest.org) is
primarily a combined effort of several researchers at Telecom ParisTech, a technical university
located in Paris, France. In the contest, a specific cryptographic protocol is selected as the
target for attacks. This protocol is then implemented on a known device such as an FPGA
evaluation board with several peripherals. On this board, power consumption characteristics
are captured given certain plaintexts or ciphertexts and keys. These power traces are bundled
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into PostGreSQL tables in a database and are broken into different categories, such as
random plaintexts being encrypted with a fixed key or with a random key. This allows for
the testing of attacks with different approaches, such as differential power analysis and the
more powerful template-based attacks which require the data introduced from more than one
fixed key. The first version of the contest uses the Data Encryption Standard (DES) as the
cryptographic scheme, whereas the second version uses the 128-bit variety of the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES-128).
The goals of this project were to research side-channel attacks and develop our own attack
based on DPA to target the DES and AES-128 cryptosystems. In this work, we begin by
introducing the reader to the idea of a side-channel attack in cryptography and the need
for the method in cryptanalysis. Further, we introduce the power analysis technique and
the motivation for its work. The Hamming Weight model is introduced as a partial means
to execute the attack and our work on the DES and AES-128 cryptographic schemes is
discussed in detail. Finally, we make conclusions on our findings as well as comment on
some Future Work for the project, such as template-based attacks for the DPA contest and
further improvements to the current attacks.
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2 Background
2.1 Side-Channel Attacks
Side-channel cryptanalysis is a branch of cryptography in which sensitive information is
gained from the physical implementation of a target cryptosystem. This is in contrast with
other forms of cryptanalysis where the algorithms and their underlying computational prob-
lems are attacked. All electronic devices leak information in a multitude of ways. Prominent
examples of this are temperature, power consumption, time taken for computations, acous-
tics and electromagnetic emanations. In general, these types of information leakages may be
tied in some way to the types of operations that the cryptographic algorithm is performing.
This makes them a very powerful tool for gaining the desired information from the cryptosys-
tem. All of the aforementioned leakages are passive, meaning that we only capture power
consumption information as it normally comes off of the target device. Further, this type
of attack requires no active manipulation of the device by the adversary. Figure 1 shows a
generic model for a side-channel as it relates to the implementation of a cryptosystem.
Figure 1: A typical cryptosystem can leak information on various side-channels.
As shown above, we have a cryptosystem which contains an implementation of a cryp-
tographic algorithm within it. Plaintexts come into the system and are encrypted with the
key into a given ciphertext. The focal point of this model is the “side-channel”, which is
where information pertaining to the cryptosystem and key are leaked. This is where the
majority of the information will be gathered and used for later analysis in a specific attack.
Due to the passive nature of the attack, we only take in information as it is executed and
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do not introduce any modifications to the cryptosystem. There also exist active attacks,
such as fault induction where the target device is altered by the attacker in order to force it
into a vulnerable state. Active attacks may be classified as non-invasive, semi-invasive and
invasive attacks. Active attacks are categorized according to the level at which the adversary
tampers with the target device. Passive side-channel attacks are the primary focus of the
project and we will make use of power consumption profiles collected from the target device.
2.2 Power Analysis Attacks
Power Analysis attacks may be defined as a type of side-channel attack where a device’s
power consumption serves as the leaked information used to exploit the particular device.
During the execution of a cryptographic algorithm on a particular device, information per-
taining to the low-level instructions the algorithm is using may be revealed in the power
traces that are retrieved. This in turn allows the attacker to identify the instructions being
used (MOV, XOR, etc), as well as branch statements to ultimately derive the cryptosystem
and recover the key. A typical generic setup for a power analysis attack is shown below in
Figure 2.
Figure 2: A depiction of a typical side-channel power analysis attack setup.
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As we can see, the setup for a power analysis side-channel attack typically consists of a
target device, a digital oscilloscope and a computing platform. A target device is consid-
ered one which is running some sort of cryptosystem and actively executing the encryption
scheme. An oscilloscope is hooked up to the target device via probes and captures the power
consumption at a determined sample rate. The collection of points containing the voltage
level measured from the circuit is called a power trace. Once captured, the traces may be
sent to a personal computer running any variant of data processing software (MATLAB,
ANSI C code, etc) to analyze and process the traces. During this stage of a power analysis
attack, the adversary does not need to know about the cryptographic algorithm being used.
However, after an initial set of traces has been accumulated, it is the job of the adversary
to used this power consumption data to learn as much about the cryptosystem as possible.
Without proper analysis of the cryptosystem from this information, the adversary will not
be able to write a successful differential power analysis attack. An example recording of a
power-based side-channel is shown below in Figure 3.
Figure 3: An example of the measured results from a side-channel reading of the power consump-
tion of a DES circuit during encryption.
The above figure shows an example of the power consumption of a circuit during an
encryption. The specific encryption used is the Data Encryption Standard (DES), described
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in Section 5. In order to obtain a noise free power trace for a given encryption, many traces
must be taken using the same plaintext input and key. These power traces are then averaged
together to remove any potential noise. When it comes to analysis of the power traces, we are
presented with three different types of attacks in which to utilize them. These attack types
are termed simple power analysis (SPA), template-based analysis, and differential power
analysis (DPA).
In a simple power analysis attack, the attacker looks at a set of power traces and using
their reasoning and knowledge of the system attempts to determine the operations being
executed and eventually the cryptographic key. In a template-based attack, the attacker
builds up a series of templates with data which has been profiled from the target device
and calculates a probability on each template in accordance with a trace. The key used
in the encryption is then determined using probability analysis [5]. In a differential power
analysis attack, traces are taken and statistically correlated to intelligently make guesses at
the key to derive the correct one. Figure 3 is an example of a power trace that belongs to a
differential power analysis attack, where multiple traces will be taken and used to discover
the key used. Simple power analysis will only work with traces which have little to no noise,
where as the template-based and differential power analysis approaches will work on power
consumption traces with varying amounts of noise due to their signal processing and error-
correcting properties. Differential power analysis attacks are the focus of this project and
are discussed in further detail in the later sections of this report.
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3 The DPA Contest
The DPA Contest4 is an online-based differential power analysis contest organized by the
VLSI research group from the COMELEC department of the Telecom ParisTech University.
This contest serves as the underlying point of departure for our project due to its publicly
available power traces as well as existing repository of DPA attacks. The contest was first
announced during the 2008 Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
(CHES). The second installment, termed DPA Context v2 was announced during CHES 2009
and builds on the previous contest with a few improvements. The goal of the DPA contest
series is to facilitate a community for side-channel attack and cryptanalytic researchers. By
providing a common set of data for particular attacks, participants are able to design and
execute attacks as well as compare them amongst others in the community for effectiveness.
In later contests, the target devices characteristics as well as schematic layouts have also
been made available for further side-channel attack analysis. Power traces for the contest
are stored in a database to allow for easy retrieval and software integration of the data. The
trace database provides a cleanly acquired set of traces for the given cryptosystem to which
attack developers can utilize for testing. All plaintexts, ciphertexts and keys are made avail-
able in the trace tables to provide an easy way to compare results for correctness. Details
on the individual competitions are explained in the following sections.
3.1 DPA Contest V1 - DES
The first installment of the DPA contest focused on a specific class of attacks, mounted on
a single cryptographic algorithm with a single implementation. The contest is made this
specific to allow for focus to be placed on the attacks instead of the concerns that arise from
a more complex cryptographic scheme. As stated before, the class of attacks under consid-
eration for the contest is power analysis type attacks, which include but are not limited to
simple, differential and template-based power analysis as well as any combination or vari-
ant of the three. The cryptographic algorithm used for the contest is the Data Encryption
Standard (DES) because it is one of the more heavily studied encryption algorithms and will
provide a simple learning curve for those approaching the attacks. The DES implementation
is run on a custom FPGA development board created by one of the contest founders, Dr.
Sylvain Guilley, as part of his Ph.D. thesis [9]. The trace acquisition board is described
extensively in Dr. Guilley’s thesis and serves as the platform from which the traces included
in the trace tables are acquired.
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The trace tables are made publicly accessible via a PostGreSQL database which is hosted
by the COMELEC department at Telecom ParisTech. The contest’s traces are organized
into separate tables according to when they were acquired and each trace includes the plain-
text message, the key used to encrypt the message, the ciphertext and the trace data stored
in ’.bin’ format which contains all of the individual data points for each trace as a function
of time. A sample query for traces in a particular trace table as well as its result is shown
below in Figure 4.
Figure 4: A sample database query for DES traces. For each trace, the message, key, and
ciphertext is given. Opening a given trace gives the power information depicting power consumption
during the 16 DES rounds.
The programmer may interact with the contest’s power trace data in a couple of ways.
As shown from the query and result, each trace comes with all of the data required to run
an attack program. To utilize this data, the programmer has a couple of options; to use the
PostGreSQL API or to download the traces remotely. Using the API, the programmer does
not need to worry about anything other than calling the database and selecting the traces.
However, this amount of work takes a significant amount of time during an attacks execu-
tion. Remotely downloading the traces improves this time, but some overhead is created as
well when dealing directly with the power traces. A reference attack written in the Python
programming language is available as a starting ground for power trace manipulation and
attack. Attacks are accepted in a variety of programming languages, including C/C++,
Python and MATLAB.
The contest’s sole criterion for attack evaluation is the number of traces required to re-
trieve the key for the particular trace table. Along with this, it is required that the key
guess is stable, meaning that the key guess must remain the same for 100 iterations of the
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attack. It is also noted that exhaustive search for the attack is not desirable unless it is only
used to acquire the last eight bits of the key, where the remaining 48 bits were found using
a power analysis attack. For more information pertaining to DPA Contest v1 and its rules
and documentation, please refer to [10].
3.2 DPA Contest V2 - AES-128
With the success of the first contest, the DPA Contest v2 was released with several improve-
ments over the previous DES-based contest. Among these changes is a switch to AES-128
as the cryptographic algorithm as well as the consideration for template-based attacks. New
metrics have also been introduced for judging the attacks besides trace count; these include
memory footprint, success rates and execution time. A different board, titled the ”SASEBO
GII” has been used to acquire the traces and its full hardware FPGA design is available.
Traces are once again stored in tables in the COMELEC trace databaasse. Unlike the DES
contest, which offered only public trace tables with fixed keys, DPA Contest v2 has three
types of tables for use with the competition. A public trace table is available for standard
attack testing and validation. Meanwhile, a private trace table will be used for the judging
of attack implementations. Both the public and private trace tables utilize fixed keys, much
like the first competition. Another new type of table, termed the profiling base, is available
for contest participants wishing to profile the target device given the traces of random plain-
texts and random keys for the cipher. An example query to the public trace table, along
with its result, is given below.
Figure 5: A sample database query for DES traces. For each trace, the message, key, and
ciphertext is given. Opening a given trace gives the power information depicting power consumpton
during the 8 AES rounds.
Another new development in the latest DPA Contest is a complete overhaul of how
attacks are executed and submitted for judging. Similar to the DES-base contest, the AES-
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128 contest contains a reference attack which demonstrates how a proper attack might work.
The contest also features a modular software breakdown, with components termed the attack
wrapper and result computer. The attack wrapper acts as the hub for the entire software
package; communicating with the user for parameters, accessing the trace database or filesys-
tem, executing the actual attack and finally shipping the result off to the result computer.
The result computer in turn takes the data from the attack wrapper as input and processes
it, giving the programmer output of their attack as well as a set of result metrics. The fol-
lowing block diagram depicts the operation of the attack wrapper and the result computer
for a given attack.
Figure 6: A block diagram outlining the attack wrapper for the DPA Contest AES contest.
The reference attack is written in C++ and it is encouraged that all participants also use
a language in which the memory footprint and execution time can be brought to a minimum.
These practices are set forth in order to maximize success in the contest with the new rules.
However, submissions will still be allowed in a variety of programming languages, including
all of the previously accepted languages such as Python and MATLAB. A reference attack is
available, written in the Python programming language, which once again serves as a decent
starting point for new researchers wishing to build attacks. However, the use of the python
attack to submit to the contest is not recommended, as it takes much more time to execute
over a C/C++ implementation. For more information on DPA Contest v2 as well as for
further description of the rules and policies, please refer to [10].
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4 Power Consumption of Cryptographic Devices
4.1 Power Models
A requirement of a differential power analysis attack which utilizes correlation as it’s primary
method of determining the key is that there be a model which can approximate the power
consumption of a circuit during the encryption process. There are several different methods
for constructing this power model. An accurate method for describing the power consumption
of a device is to simulate the device in a software environment designed to show power
consumption. If the target cryptographic device has an architecture that is known, then
such a simulation may provide a precise prediction of the power consumption of the circuit
during encryption. In instances where the target device’s architecture is not entirely known
or it is infeasible to simulate it, a more general power model must be used. The power models
currently used in these instances are the Hamming weight and the Hamming distance models.
4.2 Hamming Weight Power Model
The Hamming weight model is the most basic power consumption model. It is most applica-
ble to approximate the power consumption of a circuit utilizing a data or address bus, and
relies on the basic premise that a bus will consume an amount of power that is proportional
to the number of bits that are switched on within that bus. If no bits are switched on, the
bus will consume very little power compared to a data bus with all bits switched on. An
example is shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7: An example showing the Hamming weight model. The Hamming weight of the value
on the data bus is taken to be proportional to the power consumption of the bus.
This model can be used when very little information is known about the circuit that the
attack is being performed on. It also carries an advantage over the Hamming distance model
in that it does not require any information about the data on the bus during the encryption
routine. However, the model only weakly describes power consumption within a circuit.
While differential power analysis attacks are possible using the HW model, they are not as
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efficient compared to the Hamming distance model. In general, whenever some information
is known about the target circuit’s implementation the HD model should be used[3].
4.3 Hamming Distance Power Model
The Hamming distance model is an extension of the Hamming weight model which uses
changes in logic values in a certain time interval to determine power usage. The change can
occur in many different circuit components such as a data or address bus, register, memory,
or some other component. Using this model, you can determine the approximate power
consumption of a circuit as being proportional to the number of 0→1 and 1→0 transitions
made within the circuit. The number of bit transitions is simply the Hamming weight of
the exclusive or of the two values. For example, the Hamming distance between two register
values (R0 and R1) is given as:
HD(R0,R1) =HW (R0⊕R1)
Several basic assumptions are made when this power model is used. It is assumed that
bits which do not change (0→0, 1→1) do not contribute to the power consumption of a
circuit. It is also assumed that a 0→1 and 1→0 transition consume an equal amount of
power. In most circuits this may be found to not be the case. If more information is known
about the specific power consumption of the device, minor enhancements can be made to
the model by weighting transitions differently. An example showing how a register updating
it’s value on a clock edge is shown in Figure 8.
Figure 8: An example showing the Hamming Distance model.
As the register updates from one state to the next, it consumes a certain amount of
power. In this example, the Hamming distance shows that the power consumed when the
register updates is proportional to 6. Regardless of the weaknesses, the Hamming distance
model provides a very convenient method for determining the expected power consumption
16
of a circuit during a certain time frame. In any case where a change in data can be observed,
the Hamming distance model should be used over the Hamming weight model.
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5 Data Encryption Standard
5.1 Description
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is a commonly known block cipher employed in many
applications dating back to the late 1970’s. It was first chosen as an official Federal Infor-
mation Processing Standard (FIPS) by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) in the United States in 1976. The standard required NIST to review the algorithm
every five years to determine whether it was still approved for use. It was reviewed and reaf-
firmed for unclassified use in 1983, 1988, and 1993. During this time, DES saw widespread
use in multiple industries. The American Bankers Association (ABA) utilized DES as a
standard to protect communication in automatic teller machines, point-of-sale terminals,
and other wholesale electronic fund transfers (where it was used to protect transfers exceed-
ing $1-2 trillion per day). DES also saw use in the telecommunications industryin the 1980’s
as a standard for data communcations encryption [11].
As computing power has increased and new attacks have been formulated, DES has
become less secure. The FIPS approval in 1993 indicated the intention to replace the algo-
rithm in the near future. In 1999, the standard was reviewed once again, and triple DES
was approved for use until a new standard could be developed and approved. Even though
it is not considered as secure as it once was, DES and variations of DES are still used in
certain applications. It’s broad use and implementations make DES an appropriate target
for demonstrating power analysis side-channel attacks. Figure 9 depicts the DES encryption
scheme with the standard parameters.
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Figure 9: Flow chart depicting the operation of the DES encrpytion
As shown above, DES operates on a 64-bit message which we will term the plaintext and
a 64-bit key (8 bits of which are reserved for parity). The 64-bit plaintext is run through
a permutation matrix labeled initial permutation (IP). From there it is broken into two
32-bit halves and run through what is known as a Feistel network for 16 rounds. Finally
the message is passed through the final permutation (FP) which is just the inverse of the
initial permutation. The resulting 64-bit message is now known as the ciphertext; this con-
stitutes a complete encryption. To decrypt the ciphertext, one reverses the algorithm to
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recover the plaintext. The 48-bit subkeys are handled by the key scheduler, and this al-
lows for a different 48-bit subkey to be created from the overall 64-bit key for each round of
DES operations. For a more complete description and explanation of DES, please refer to [4].
5.2 Power Characteristics
Before any side-channel attack on the DES implementation used by the DPA contest can be
mounted, we must first ensure that the power consumption of the circuit can be approximated
with one of the models described. If the Hamming weight or Hamming distance model can
determine the expected power consumption of the DES circuit, then that opens up the
possibility of an attack on the system. To determine whether such a weakness exists, we
refer to the DES implementation used by the DPA Contest trace aquisition board, specifically
described in [9]. Figure 10 shows how the DES routine is implemented on the trace aquisition
board.
Figure 10: The DPA Contest trace aquisition board DES co-processor layout. Designed for
parallel execution scheduled at one round per clock cycle. [9]
From this figure, we can see that there is a single data register (LR) that gets updated
each round and which holds the intermediate results of the DES operation. This register is
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a prime target for the Hamming distance power model. If the model is accurate, then the
Hamming distance between the initial value of the register and the next value of the register
(after the DES round is complete) will indicate a portion of the power consumption of the
circuit. This Hamming distance plays the role of the sensitive data in our attack. A single
power trace from the DPA Contest database contains the necessary encryption information
(plaintext, key, and ciphertext) as well as the power information. Because the plaintext and
key are known, we can choose any intermediate round, determine the Hamming distance
between the values of this register at the start and end of that round, and use that as our
sensitive data. However, in the unkown key situation only the first and last rounds are
vulnerable to this basic method of attack. This is because either the initial value or the
post-round value of LR must be known to retrieve the key. If we choose an arbitrary round,
we would have to guess at both of these values. For our power consumption profiling, we
demonstrate the correlation between the first round sensitive data and the power information
contained in the power trace. This power profiling was done entirely in Matlab.
The first step in the power profiling is to determine the sensitive data that will have
some relationship to the power information. We chose to look at the first round input and
output to find this sensitive information. Initially, we know the LR register holds the 64-bit
plaintext message. The right 32 bits of this message are called R1, and contain the bits
that are input into the Feistel function (together with the first round subkey) during the
DES encryption. After the first round of DES is complete, the LR register is updated with
its new value. The right 32 bits of the now updated register are called R2. Only the right
32-bit portion of the LR register is used in the power profiling because it is only these bits
which are dependent on the key. This is important for the unknown key scenario where we
will need to determine the key bits used. After this first round, we have the two pieces of
information that we need in order to perform our power analysis. The Hamming distance
between R1 and R2 becomes the sensitive data for the program.
The next step in the power profiling is to take the power information from the power
traces. Each DPA Contest DES power trace consists of 20000 points of power information
taken at a rate of 20 ×109 samples⁄s. We consider a given trace Pi = (pi(t1), pi(t2), ..., pi(tm))
to be a collection of such points indicating the voltage of the circuit at time ti. By a power
trace, we will mean this collection of points. Just by looking at the trace, the 16 power peaks
corresponding to the 16 rounds of DES can be identified (refer to Figure 3). We take the
local maximum point in the first round peak to be our power information, pmax. This point
is the maximum point between t5700 and t5800. The first goal in our power profiling is to show
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that there is a clear relationship between the power information and the sensitive data. We
ran through 4000 power traces, retrieving the first round power consumption peak (pmax)
and the first round sensitive data for each trace (HW (R1 ⊕R2)). For each sensitive data
value (from 0 to 32), we take the average of the power consumption peak values across all
power traces which contain that sensitive data value. The resulting plot is shown in Figure
11.
Figure 11: Power consumption versus Hamming distance.
The results show a clear relationship between the sensitive data and the power consump-
tion of the circuit during the first DES round. In general, a higher Hamming distance results
in more power consumed in the DES encryption process. This verifies the utility of the Ham-
ming distance model for this specific DES implementation. Based on this information, it is
possible to determine a sample correlation between the power consumption and the Ham-
ming distance data. We calculate the correlation between the power trace and the sensitive
data for the given trace using Pearson’s sample correlation coefficient, given by:
rsb = ∑ni=1(h(sb)i − h(sb))(pi(tj) − p(tj))(n − 1)σhσp(tj) (1)
The mean value across all traces of a point tj is given as p(tj) and the standard deviation
of these values at a point tj is given as σp(tj). For each trace i, there exists sensitive data which
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can be exploited. The sensitive data for a trace i is denoted as hi, with the mean sensitive
data over all traces hi, and standard deviation σh. Using this equation to correlate the power
information to the first round sensitive data, there should exist a spike in correlation around
the first round. To test this, we calculate this coefficient across every point (j = 1 to 20000)
in each power trace for 1000 total power traces (the correlation improves as more traces are
used, 1000 traces is sufficient to produce high correlation values). The results are shown in
Figure 12.
Figure 12: The correlation between the first round sensitive data and the power traces for each
point j in the power traces.
From this figure, it is apparent that there is a strong correlation between the sensitive
data and the power trace centered around j = 5750. This further verifies the validity of
the Hamming distance model in relation to the DES implementation used. However, it is
still not completely adequate to say that an attack is possible based on this information. To
further ensure that we can recover key bits, it is necessary to show that the correlation is still
strong given only one half-byte of sensitive data (corresponding to a single S-box output).
To do this, we repeat the correlation calculation over all of the traces using only the first
S-box output as the sensitive data. Even with a reduction in sensitive data, there is still a
strong correlation between the data and the power information, as shown in Figure 13.
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Figure 13: The correlation between the first round sensitive data and the power traces for each
point j in the power trace.
Based on the information gained from this power profiling, we can conclude that a basic
differential power analysis attack is possible on the DES system used to create the DPA
Contest power traces. The next section outlines the details of how to retrieve key bits from
the power traces using this information.
5.3 Basic DPA Attack
The basic differential power analysis attack described here relies on two properties of the DES
encryption. The first is the fact that the individual DES S-box outputs produce sensitive data
that can be correlated to the power information recorded from the target device. The second
fact is that each DES S-box input uses only 6 bits of the 48-bit subkey used for that round,
which is low enough that they may be exhaustively searched to find the highest correlation.
The purpose of the attack implemented is to retrieve the first round subkey used. Once
enough of this subkey is determined, the full key used in the DES encryption can be found
by exhaustive search methods (if desired). The entire attack program was written in Matlab.
The DPA attack program is set up similarly to the power characteristics program, however
this time we must guess the key bits used and select those that produce the highest correlation
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for each S-box. For each S-box, we select the 6 bits from the plaintext that are used which is
dictated by the initial permutation and the expansion permutation inside the Feistel function.
For example, in the case of the first S-box these bits are (7, 57, 49, 41, 33 25) of the plaintext.
Because the output of the S-box is dependent on the unknown 6-bit key, we simply produce
an array of 26 potential S-box outputs, one for each key guess (from 0 to 63). For each
potential 4 bit S-box output, we calculate the Hamming distance between that output and
the corresponding bits in the plaintext (e.g. for key guess 12, HW [R212(1 ∶ 4)⊕R1(1 ∶ 4)],
where we have used R212 to denote the potential value of the register using key guess 12).
The result is an array of 64 sensitive data values, one for each potential key. Using the
correlation coefficient equation (equation 1), we calculate the correlation between each one
of the 64 sensitive data values and the power information. This process is repeated using
many power traces to build up the correlation coefficient. After a sufficient number of traces,
there will exist a peak in the correlation which corresponds to the correct key. The results
for a single S-box after 500 power traces are seen in Figure 14. This shows the correct key
guess as a spike in the correlation at guess 14 (which tells us the correct subkey for this
S-box is 13).
Figure 14: The correlation between the power information and the sensitive data for each 6-bit
key guess in a single S-box.
The process is repeated for each S-box to create a table of correlation coefficients con-
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taining 64 entries for all 8 S-boxes. For each S-box, the key guess with the maxmimum
correlation is the correct key. An example plot for all 8 S-boxes is shown in Figure 15. This
shows the correct 6-bit key values for the first round subkey (56 11 59 38 0 13 25 55) as
peaks in the correlation.
Figure 15: The correlation between the sensitive data and the power information for all 8 S-boxes.
Once the program has settled on a key for a certain number of power traces (this threshold
is arbitrarily set to 100 for the DPA Contest [10]), the program will output to the Matlab
console the subkey, the amount of time taken to determine the correct subkey, and the
number of traces required to determine the key. An example of the program output is shown
in Figure 16. The DPA Contest power trace database consisted of 80000 trace files. Running
over a large number of traces, our program was able to find the subkey using an average
of 455 traces. The maximum number of traces required to find the key was 826, and the
minimum number of traces required was 269. The DPA Contest reference attack had an
minimum average trace count of 485. The more advanced entries in the first DPA Contest
were able to reduce the average trace count to as little as 141 traces using more advanced
statistical methods. The average time to discover the subkey was between 3 and 4 minutes.
This is especially fast compared to the fastest exhaustive search on a DES encrypted message:
reportedly, 22 hours and 15 minutes by Deep Crack in 1999 [7].
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Figure 16: Example output from the DES DPA attack program.
The generic DPA attack described in this section carries with it a number of advantages.
The attack can be mounted in a known-plaintext only or known-ciphertext only scenario,
which is innately better than attacks that require plaintext-ciphertext pairs. The DPA
attack is also extremely quick compared to exhaustive search methods, taking mere minutes
as opposed to several days for exhaustive key searches. The downside to the DPA attack
is that it requires physical access to the device and requires a reliable method of aquiring
relatively noise free power traces from the device. Noise can be reduced in the power trace
aquisition by taking many samples using the same plaintext and key and averaging them, as
described in [3]. In the next section, we describe the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
and discuss how the same basic method of attack can be utilized to discover key bits used
in AES encryptions.
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6 Advanced Encryption Standard
6.1 Description
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a collection of three separate block ciphers;
AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 and is the successor to DES. It was selected as an encryption
standard by NIST as a Federal Information Processing Standard in 2001 after a lengthy
competition. The cipher was originally developed by Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen,
two Belgian cryptographers, and was first published in 1998. The three separate block
ciphers are ordered in terms of the key size that can be used for encryption and decryption.
AES has become the popular replacement for its predecessor and is currently used in
a variety of applications where security is a concern. These properties make AES another
good candidate for work with power analysis side-channel attacks. The following flow chart
depicts a typical AES-128 cipher in operation.
Figure 17: A flow chart showing the operation of the AES-128 encryption.
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As shown above, an AES-128 cipher starts with a 128-bit block of plaintext along with a
128-bit key and executes ten AES rounds to compute a 128-bit ciphertext. Unlike its prede-
cessor DES which is based on a Feistel network, AES is based on a substitution permutation
network. Each stage of each individual AES round is computed on a 4x4 byte array known
as the state. Within each round, AES consists of four main stages; SubBytes, ShiftRows,
MixColumns and AddRoundKey. AES uses the Rijndael key schedule for its key scheduling
to allow for a different sub-key to be generated for each round. For a more complete descrip-
tion and explanation of AES, please refer to [6]. The next section outlines how a standard
AES implementation is vulnerable to the same basic DPA attack that we used on DES.
6.2 Power Characteristics
Similar to DES, in order to determine whether a differential power analysis attack on the
AES system is possible we must first verify that the power consumption can be approximated
using some power model. Before even implementing any programs to determine whether the
Hamming distance power model will apply to AES we can make several assertions about the
power consumption. First, based on the implementation given in Figure 18, it is clear that
the plaintext is exclusive or’d with the first 16 bytes of the expanded AES key before being
loaded into the register. This effectively limits our ability to attack the first round using
the plaintext with the Hamming distance model, as the model relies on seeing a switch in
register values where one side of the switch is known.
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Figure 18: The implementation of AES-128 on the SASEBO aquisition board. [8]
Another initial issue seen in this implementation is that the power consumption caused
by the data registers updating will contribute significantly less to the overall power con-
sumption of the circuit than in the DES implementation. This is because an AES round will
consume a fair amount of power (especially during the SubBytes step) compared to a DES
round. This means the correlation computed using the Hamming distance model should be
considerably lower than the correlation computed in the DES power characterization. Based
on this information we can say that our attack must be run on the final round of encryption
and that our attack will take significantly more traces than the DES attack. An example
power trace taken from the DPA Contest trace database is shown in Figure 19. This clearly
shows the 10 rounds of AES-128 encryption.
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Figure 19: A sample AES power trace showing the power consumption over all rounds of an
AES-128 encryption.
The first step in power characterization is similar to that in DES. We must show that
there is some relationship between the Hamming distance of the bits in the data registers
before and after the 10th round of encryption changes and the power consumption of the
circuit. Initially, the 4 data registers hold the output of round 9 of the AES encryption.
Because we know the key, we can determine the value of the data in these registers at this
time (R9). After the 10th round of encryption, the value in these registers is updated to the
final ciphertext (R10). The Hamming distance between the R9 and R10 values becomes the
sensitive data which we will correlate to the power consumption. The process for showing
this relationship was the same is in the DES power characterization. First, we run through
many AES traces and determine the sensitive data value for each trace. We also take the
average power consumption of the AES circuit during the final round for each trace. For
each sensitive data value, we plot the corresponding average power value. Figure 20 shows
the results over 19000 traces.
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Figure 20: The relationship between the sensi-
tive data and the power usage for the AES-128
circuit, including all points.
Figure 21: The distribution of sensitive data
in the AES traces, showing the number of power
traces at each sensitive data value.
Towards the edges of the graph the values appear erratic, while towards the middle there
is a clear trend upwards. The edges don’t follow the same trend because there are relatively
few power traces which have sensitive data values that are lower than 50 and higher than
77 (with none below 42 or above 84, as shown on the distribution graph in Figure 21). This
results in points which do not have enough power trace values. This results in a greater
effect on the average value by more extreme power values at those sensitive data points.
By replotting the data using only those sensitive data values with large numbers of power
traces, we can see more clearly the general trend. We chose a lower bound of 50 and an
upper bound of 77 (both contain at least 80 power traces) and replotted the resulting data,
shown in Figure 22. This shows a clear upward trend in the relationship between sensitive
data and power consumption, and implies that an attack on the circuit utilizing correlation
with the Hamming distance model may be possible.
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Figure 22: The relationship between the sensitive data and the power usage for the AES-128
circuit, including only those points with large numbers of values to average.
The next step in our power consumption profiling is to build up a sample correlation be-
tween the sensitive data and the power consumption using a similar method that was used in
the DES power characterization. Using the Pearson sample correlation coefficient equation
(Equation 1), we can determine this correlation using the AES-128 power traces provided by
the DPA Contest database. For the entire 16 bytes of the data register updating, there is a
strong correlation between the data and the power usage in the final round, as seen in Figure
23. Compared to the correlation found in the DES system, the peak of the correlation is
much smaller. However, because there is a definite peak compared to the rest of the plot,
we are not concerned about this.
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Figure 23: The correlation of sensitive data and power consumption for all 16 bytes of a message.
This figure also shows that there is a broad region on the power trace where the power
consumption correlates strongly to the data (compared to the DES trace in Figure 12 where
there is a spike in correlation rather than a region). This will become important when we
need to determine which point (or collection of points) on the power trace to correlate to
the sensitive data for the DPA attack. There are several options which we can use in the
attack scenario. We can use:
• The peak of the power consumption.
• The integral of the power consumption over some number of power trace points.
• The sum of squares of the power consumption over some number of points.
• The sum of absolute values of the power consumption over a certain number of points.
While all of these choices may work, one may slightly reduce the number of traces required
for a successful attack over the others. [3]
To have the ability to determine the subkey used in the final round of encryption, we
must see a clear correlation between the sensitive data and the power information for only
one byte at a time in the data register. As one byte updates, it needs to have a significant
enough effect on the power consumption of the circuit as a whole that there is an increase in
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the correlation coefficient. This is shown to be true in Figure 24, where we can see that even
with a reduction in the amount of sensitive data we can still see a peak in the correlation
around the time of the final round.
Figure 24: The correlation of sensitive data and power consumption for a single byte of a message
over 10000 traces.
Our initial intuition that the AES circuit will require far more traces to successfully
discover the key becomes more apparent here. Our other initial claim that the Hamming
distance model would not as accurately describe the power consumption of the circuit is also
supported. However, although the correlation peak is far less than that in the DES example
(Figure 13), it still stands out enough from the rest of the power trace and therefore can be
used in an attack. The next section describes how we discover the key using the Hamming
distance power model.
6.3 Basic DPA Attack
Based on our knowledge that each individual byte in the 16 byte message of the AES-128
encryption can show a peak in the correlation to the power traces; we developed an attack
program in Matlab. This program could succesfully determine the key used in the final round
of encryption. One benefit of attacking the final round in AES is that the MixColumns step
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is skipped in this round, making the attack faster in terms of computation. The attack is
similar to the one used to break the DES system. However it targets the ciphertext side
rather than the plaintext side of encryption.
The first step in the AES attack program is to split the 128-bit ciphertext message into
byte long blocks. The AES-128 algorithm operates on each byte individually, which allows
us to guess the 8-bit portion of the round key used for each byte individually. Focusing on
one byte at a time, we take each byte of the ciphertext and run through the AES decryption
method 256 times (once for each possible key). The result is an array of 256 potential values
for the final round input. For each potential byte value, we take the Hamming distance
between it and the known ciphertext byte that corresponds to the same location in the data
register (these are shifted as a result of the ShiftRows step in the AES algorithm). We
are left with an array of 256 Hamming distances, which approximately model the power
consumption of the circuit for each possible key value. The final step is to correlate these
Hamming distance values to the actual AES power traces to determine which key is actually
correct. An example of the resulting correlation for a single byte is shown in Figure 25. The
graph shows that there is a peak in the correlation at key guess 160, which tells us that the
8-bit key used for that byte was 159. Matlab array indexes start at 1, so the key is taken as
the index value minus one.
Figure 25: The correlation between the sensitive data and the power consumption for the 256 key
guesses for a single byte.
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Figure 26: The correlation between the sensitive data and the power consumption for the 256 key
guesses for all 16 bytes.
The same process is repeated 16 times, once for each byte in the message. The result
is a table of 256 correlation values, one for each potential key, for each byte (16x256 total).
The peak correlation for each byte is taken to be the correct key used in the final round of
encryption. The final plot showing all the peaks in the correlation across all 16 bytes in the
message is shown in Figure 26.
Overall, our attack program could successfully discover the key bits used by the AES
encryption (in the final round) using only the ciphertext and the power trace information.
The amount of computation was much greater than in the DES DPA attack, as 256 possible
keys needed to be accounted for in 16 bytes as opposed to 64 possible keys for 8 S-boxes.
However, the jump in computation number only caused an increase of a few minutes in the
overall run time of the attack. To run the DPA attack through all 20000 traces that each
AES-128 key produced took only 7-8 minutes (on a 3.0 Ghz computer). The correct key was
aquired after an average of around 10000 traces, with 5700 being the minimum number of
traces required, and 12000 being the maximum. An example output of our program on the
first set of AES power traces is shown in Figure 27.
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Figure 27: An example of the output of the Matlab AES DPA program.
The differential power analysis attack used to determine the first round subkey used in the
DES algorithm was shown to also apply to the AES-128 algorithm with minor changes. The
next logical step in the development of the attack would be to improve it to use as few power
traces as possible. This is in line with the goal of the 2nd DPA Contest competition. While
minor improvements were made by changing which points were used from the power traces,
more substantial improvements should be made. Some potential areas for improvement
include developing a more accurate power model for the AES system or looking at the power
information in the frequency domain. Alternatively we could use a more powerful template
attack.
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7 Conclusions
In completing the project we were successfully able to recover the DES and AES-128 cryp-
tosystem keys by mounting a DPA attack. The AES-128 implementation proved to be more
difficult and the attacks shortcomings are explained further in this section. For the DES
implementation the first round subkey was successfully recovered with 455 traces on average
and an average execution time of less than 5 minutes. For AES-128, we were able to recover
the subkey used with average of 10000 traces and an average execution time of 9 minutes.
Since our attack was designed with the DES implementation in mind, there were few
traces required for recovery. This is accounted for by low resolution correlations which led
to fairly accurate key guesses during the attacks runtime. However, running the attack on
the AES cryptosystem resulted in very low correlations even after multiple executions. This
is in part due to the attack not taking into consideration many of the more intricate parts of
the AES implementation, such as the AddRoundKey and MixColumns stages. Due to some
similarities between the two algorithms, we were still able to recover the final round subkey,
but with a far greater amount of traces compared to the DES implementation.
While we only calculate the first and final round subkeys, to recover the rest of the
fixed key for the DES implementation one would need to either rerun the attack or simply
exhaustive search the keyspace once enough subkeys were found. However, when our attack
considers an AES implementation it is noted that the full key may not be able to be recovered
unless the key expansion can be reversed somehow. After a complete execution of the attack
on a DES cryptosystem, we recovered 48 out of the 56 bits used for the fixed key. A simple
exhaustive search algorithm would be able to recover the full key in a short amount of time.
From the success of our attack on the power traces from the DPA contest, it is clear
that these types of side-channel attacks are very powerful when it comes to breaking a
cryptosystem. What makes a DPA attack so powerful is that it can make plaintext or
ciphertext only attacks, which greatly increase the versatility when attacking a target device.
DPA-based attacks also perform much faster than other techniques such as exhaustive search.
However, this type of side-channel attack requires access to the physical hardware in order
to obtain the traces required for its execution.
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8 Future Work
Given the success of the attack in DES and AES-128 implementations, there are a few
directions in which this project could go towards future work. In current research, some of
the only reliable models for power consumption to lead to a cryptosystems key have been
the Hamming Weight and Hamming Distance models. One excellent way of improving our
attack could come directly from a new power model or better utilization of the existing power
models. This would allow higher correlations in the power traces and lead to more correct
key guesses, resulting in the key space being narrowed down further to make exhaustive
search techniques feasible. The way power traces are statistically correlated after the power
model has been utilized is another source for additional work. More complex statistical
methods could be explored in order to improve the correlations even further and allow for
more information to be obtained from the power traces.
An alternative method to explore power analysis side-channel attacks for breaking cryp-
tographic implementations would be template-based attacks. Template-based attacks are
considered to be one of the most powerful types of side-channel attacks. This is because
the statistical functions involved capture a large amount of data from the power traces and
utilize probability density functions in order to obtain correct key guesses. For more infor-
mation on template-based attacks, please see [5]. These types of attacks are now feasible
with the introduction of a profiling trace table in the DPA Contest v2. This table contains
approximately one million power traces, each with a random plaintext and key as well as the
corresponding ciphertext. Along with the FPGA design for the AES-128 implementation,
the profiling table makes it possible to analyze the system and build up templates which
could be later used in a template-based attack.
One final possiblity for future MQP work in the area of differential power analysis attacks
is to create an AES implementation on an FPGA, record power traces, and attempt to attack
these traces. An example of AES trace aquisition on a Spartan 3E FPGA development board
is given in [12]. It would give more insight into the physical aspects of the DPA side-channel
attack.
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